EC'17: Empirical Mechanism Design for Optimizing Clearing Interval in Frequent Call Markets

EC'17: Empirical Mechanism Design for Optimizing Clearing Interval in Frequent Call MarketsПодробнее

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Lecture 10: Dynamic optimal mechanisms (Mechanism Design)Подробнее

ISSCC 2012: 17.2 A 259.6μW Nonlinear HRV-EEG Chaos Processor with Body Channel Communication...Подробнее

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