EC'17: A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract

EC'17: A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: AbstractПодробнее

EC'17: A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract

EC'17: Repeated Sales with Multiple Strategic BuyersПодробнее

EC'17: Repeated Sales with Multiple Strategic Buyers

Third Party Data Providers Ruin Simple MechanismsПодробнее

Third Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms

EC'17: The Competition Complexity of Auctions: Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional BiddersПодробнее

EC'17: The Competition Complexity of Auctions: Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders

Simple Mechanisms for a (Sub)Additive BuyerПодробнее

Simple Mechanisms for a (Sub)Additive Buyer

EC'17: Pricing and Optimization in Shared Vehicle Systems: An Approximation FrameworkПодробнее

EC'17: Pricing and Optimization in Shared Vehicle Systems: An Approximation Framework

Ophir Friedler: A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with ComplementsПодробнее

Ophir Friedler: A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements

EC'17: The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget Constrained Buyer: The General CaseПодробнее

EC'17: The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget Constrained Buyer: The General Case

EC'17: Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social WelfareПодробнее

EC'17: Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare

EC'17: Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer MechanismsПодробнее

EC'17: Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms

Alon Eden: Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent ValuesПодробнее

Alon Eden: Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Values

EC'18: Optimal Deterministic Mechanisms for an Additive BuyerПодробнее

EC'18: Optimal Deterministic Mechanisms for an Additive Buyer

EC'20: Simple, Credible, and Approximately-Optimal AuctionsПодробнее

EC'20: Simple, Credible, and Approximately-Optimal Auctions

EC'17: Fairness Incentives for Myopic AgentsПодробнее

EC'17: Fairness Incentives for Myopic Agents

Inbal Talgam Cohen on "Interdependent Values in Near-Optimal Mechanism Design"Подробнее

Inbal Talgam Cohen on 'Interdependent Values in Near-Optimal Mechanism Design'

EC'17: Empirical Mechanism Design for Optimizing Clearing Interval in Frequent Call MarketsПодробнее

EC'17: Empirical Mechanism Design for Optimizing Clearing Interval in Frequent Call Markets